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A Critical Analysis of Refugee Law*
IRA J. KURZBAN**
A review of immigration law and history reveals that the
United States admits large numbers of refugees from commu-
nist countries, but grants entrance to a disproportionate few
from noncommunist states. The author interprets these figures
to mean that the government uses the refugee admissions pro-
cess as a ploy to accomplish political objectives. This article
exposes the inequity in the admissions process by examining
the legislative and executive responses to the refugee problem.
Although many had hoped that the Refugee Act of 1980 would
eliminate the political bias in refugee policy, the author sug-
gests that the Act, in fact, institutionalizes preexisting political
biases.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In early April 1980, thousands of Cuban nationals crashed the
gates to the Peruvian Embassy in Havana seeking to emigrate from
Cuba. On April 14, President Jimmy Carter, citing the humanitar-
ian goals of immigration law,' agreed to allow 3,500 Cubans to
* The author wishes to thank Bradshaw Lotspeich for his assistance in the preparation
of this article.
** Vice-chairperson of the American Bar Association's Refugee Assistance Program;
Member, Board of Governors of American Immigration Lawyers Association; Partner,
Kurzban, Kurzban & Weigner, P.A.
1. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter Act), ch. 477, 66 Stat.
163 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)) [hereinafter cited
as INA]. The President has authority to order the admission of refugees for special humani-
tarian reasons. See, e.g., 47 Fed. Reg. 46,483 (1982) (admission of persons in Vietnam with
past or present ties to the United States).
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come to the United States.' In the succeeding days, however, this
benevolent policy proved to be a pretext for the political consider-
ations that actually prompted the administration's reaction.'
The American government's response to the Cuban refugee4
influx demonstrates the tractability of immigration policy to politi-
cal judgment. This phenomenon is not new. Since 1948," our gov-
ernment has used the refugee admissions process for political pur-
poses. The result is a selection and admission process that is
2. President Carter's early pronouncements presaged the decision:
The President remains deeply concerned for the safety and freedom of the
10,800 Cubans who are seeking asylum in the Peruvian Embassy in Havana.
. . . The problem of Cuban refugees is one for all the Americas as well as
the world ....
. . . This humanitarian crisis requires an immediate international response.
The world also looks to Cuba to assure humanitarian conditions for the ref-
ugees pending their evacuation ....
President's Designation of 3,500 Cubans in the Peruvian Embassy in Havana, PUBLIC PA-
PERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1 JIMMY CARTER 1980-1981, at 682-83 (Apr. 14, 1980).
3. See infra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
4. As defined in the Refugee Act of 1980,
The term "refugee" means (A) any person who is outside any country of
such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is
outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is
unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or
herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion, or (B) in such special circum-
stances as the President after appropriate consultation (as defined in section
1157(e) of this title) may specify, any person who is within the country of such
person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, within the
country in which such person is habitually residing, and who is persecuted or
who has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, national-
ity, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. The term "ref-
ugee" does not include any person who ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise
participated, in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, na-
tionality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201(a)(42), 94 Stat. 102, 102 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (Supp.
V 1981)).
The Act provides a statutory definition of "refugee" that corresponds to the definition
in the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature
July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 152 [hereinafter cited as U.N. Convention]. The United
States adopted articles 2-34 of the Convention when it acceded to the United Nations Pro-
tocol on the Status of Refugees, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 622 (1968),
T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter cited as U.N. Protocol]. For a discussion of
how the U.N. Protocol has modified United States immigration law, see infra notes 54-59
and accompanying text.
5. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, ch. 647, 62 Stat. 1009, as amended by Act of June 16,
1950, ch. 262, 64 Stat. 219; Act of June 28, 1951, ch. 167, 65 Stat. 96 (repealed 1957).
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promoted and ultimately molded by the unique value of refugees
as political metaphors of alleged communist oppression.
The Refugee Act of 19806 reflects the government's most re-
cent attempt to establish objective criteria for determining refugee
admissions. Although much heralded as the end of the political use
of the refugee process, 7 the Act actually embodies executive
choice.8 Try as it might, Congress has failed to remedy the most
pressing problem plaguing our admissions program: the absence of
legal standards to define refugee status, thereby allowing the
wholesale infusion of political biases into a purportedly neutral
policy.
This article explores the politicization of the refugee admis-
sions process. An examination of the legislative and executive re-
sponses to refugee problems (Part II) provides the backdrop for a
look at current refugee policy and the most recent legislation gov-
erning refugee admissions (Part III).
II. THE LAW CIRCUMSCRIBING REFUGEE ADMISSIONS
A. A Historical Overview of Refugee Law
Political considerations have long governed the refugee admis-
sions process. In the early 1900's, Congress established qualitative
criteria for immigration. e The statutes limited or excluded the ad-
mission of certain classes of refugees, such as anarchists, illiterates,
and vagrants.10 Eventually, the per-country quotas of the Act of
May 19, 19211 supplemented these qualitative standards. The
quotas established by this Act and later legislation 2 favored refu-
6. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections of 8 and 22 U.S.C.
(Supp. V 1981)).
7. As explained by co-sponsor Senator Kennedy, the Act "establishes ... a comprehen-
sive U.S. refugee resettlement and assistance program .... The basic purpose of the bill
... is ... to help insure greater equity in our treatment of refugees and displaced persons
and to establish a more orderly procedure for their admission into the United States in
reasonable numbers." 125 CONG. REC. S2630 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1979); see also S. REP. No.
256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 141, 142 (The
United States should establish a refugee "policy which will treat all refugees fairly and as-
sist all refugees equally.").
8. See infra notes 82-103 and accompanying text.
9. Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874, as amended by Refugee Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); Act of Mar. 26,
1910, ch. 128, 36 Stat. 263; Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, 34 Stat. 898; Act of Mar. 3, 1903,
ch. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213.
10. Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 875-78 (repealed 1952).
11. Ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5 (repealed 1952).
12. E.g., Displaced Persons Act of 1948, ch. 647, 62 Stat. 1009, as amended by Act of
1982]
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gees from communist countries whose plight proved to be politi-
cally advantageous to American interests. By the end of World
War II, the laws regulating refugee admissions were obviously a
product of political pressures and not humanitarian concerns.
The cold war was just beginning when Congress enacted the
Displaced Persons Act of 1948.1' This Act proposed to provide
sanctuary for those fleeing Fascist or Soviet persecution.1 4 Techni-
cal cutoff dates, however, precluded the issuance of a substantial
number of visas to persons, particularly Jews, who had fled Fascist
oppression.'5 Subsequent amendments to the Act in 195016 exposed
Congress's intent to use refugee law as a vehicle for cold war poli-
cies. The amendments furthered political objectives by permitting
anticommunist refugees living within the People's Republic of
China and the Soviet Union or its satellites to obtain visas. 7 Over-
all, the underlying goals of the Displaced Persons Act were consis-
tent with our foreign policy objectives. Admitting Eastern Euro-
pean refugees into the United States achieved the twin aims of
relieving our Western European allies' economic burdens, and pub-
licizing the discontent among the citizens of communist countries.
The Refugee Relief Act of 195318 reflected the cold war
mentality even more explicitly than did the Displaced Persons
Act." The 1953 legislation contained provisions to expedite the ad-
mission of refugees fleeing communist-dominated countries in Eu-
rope and the Soviet Union. 20 Amendments to the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 19522" continued this policy by expanding the
definition of "refugee escapee" to include people in flight from
communist or communist-dominated countries.2 2 Thus, for the first
June 16, 1950, ch. 262, 64 Stat. 219; Act of June 28, 1951, ch. 167, 65 Stat. 96 (repealed
1957).
13. Id.
14. Anker & Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act
of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 13 (1981).
15. Id.
16. Act of June 16, 1950, ch. 262, 64 Stat. 219 (repealed 1966).
17. See H.R. REP. No. 581, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1950); Anker & Posner, supra note
14, at 13 n.16.
18. Ch. 336, 67 Stat. 400 (1953), amended by Act of Aug. 31, 1954, ch. 68, Stat. 1044.
19. Ch. 647, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948).
20. Ch. 336, § 4(a), 67 Stat. 400, 401; see H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1069, 83d Cong., 1st
Sess., reprinted in 1953 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2122, 2122-24. The congressional
delegates assured the public that the 1953 Act was "an emergency relief measure designed
to implement certain phases of American foreign policy. It is not intended to represent any
precedent or commitment . . . ." Id. at 2122-23.
21. Ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
22. Act of Sept. 11, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-316, § 15(c)(1), 71 Stat. 639, 643 (codified at 8
[Vol. 36:865
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time, Congress defined "refugee" ideologically.
In 1965 Congress incorporated the definition of "refugee es-
capee" into the Immigration and Nationality Act, 3 which provided
for quotas24 on the annual admission of refugees from the Eastern
Hemisphere. Although previous legislation provided for the admis-
sion of refugees from particular regions,25 the 1965 amendments to
the Immigration and Nationality Act established a nonspecific,
permanent refugee admissions process. Nevertheless, even these
admission requirements were delineated along ideological and geo-
graphical lines; refugees were admitted into the United States if
they fled from either communist or communist-dominated coun-
tries or a country within the general area of the Middle East.26 Al-
though Congress incorporated these refugee admissions within the
general preference system of immigration admissions, the govern-
ment allocated visas only for persons fleeing the Eastern
Hemisphere.2 7
B. The Legislative and Executive Responses to the Refugee
Problem
Through the use of parole, deportation, and asylum powers,
the executive branch also has manipulated refugee admissions to
satisfy cold war objectives. Of course, the President generally can-
not manipulate refugee admissions unless the Congress provides
U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (repealed 1976)). Section 15(c)(1) provides:
[T]he term "refugee-escapee" means any alien who, because of persecution or
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion has fled or
shall flee (A) from any Communist, Communist-dominated, or Communist-occu-
pied area, or (B) from any country within the general area of the Middle East,
and who cannot return to such area, or to such country, on account of race,
religion, or political opinion.
Id. For a discussion of section 15(c)(1), see GORDON & ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND
PROCEDURE § 2.54 (1967); cf. Ishak v. District Director, INS, 432 F. Supp. 624 (N.D. Ill.
1977) (alien denied permanent residence status because of failure to prove a valid fear of
persecution).
23. The 1965 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act incorporated section
15(c)(1) as section 203(a)(7), known as the "conditional entry" provision. Act of Oct. 3, 1965,
Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 203(a)(7), 79 Stat. 911, 913 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (repealed
1976); see infra note 61.
24. S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG &
AD. NEWS 141, 146.
25. See supra notes 13-22 and accompanying text.
26. Act of Sept. 11, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-316, § 15(c)(1), 71 Stat. 639, 643 (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (repealed 1976)).
27. S. REP. No. 256, supra note 24, at 4, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 144.
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him with the requisite legal authority and tools. Indeed, as the pre-
ceding section demonstrates, the legislative branch is equally sus-
ceptible to political pressures in formulating refugee admission
procedures. This section illustrates how the political parochialism
of the President and Congress is specifically reflected in modern-
day refugee law.
1. PAROLE
Section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
19522" empowers the Attorney General to permit aliens to be pa-
roled into the United States. Although Congress originally in-
tended for the Justice Department to use this parole authority for
the temporary admission of individual aliens on an emergency ba-
sis,29 it quickly became 'the chosen vehicle for admitting refugees
28. INA § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1976), amended by Refugee Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 203(0, 94 Stat. 102, 107 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), (B)
(Supp. V 1981)). Until 1980, this section provided:
The Attorney General may in his discretion parole into the United States
temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe for emergent reasons or
for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest any alien applying for admis-
sion to the United States, but such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as
an admission of the alien and when the purposes of such parole shall, in the
opinion of the Attorney General, have been served the alien shall forthwith re-
turn or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his
case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other
applicant for admission to the United States.
INA § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1976). Section 212(d)(5) now provides:
(A) The Attorney General may, except as provided in subparagraph (B), in
his discretion parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as
he may prescribe for emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the pub-
lic interest any alien applying for admission to the United States, but such pa-
role of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien and when
the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Attorney General, have
been served the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from
which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in
the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United
States.
(B) The Attorney General may not parole into the United States an alien
who is a refugee unless the Attorney General determines that compelling reasons
in the public interest with respect to that particular alien require that the alien
be paroled into the United States rather than be admitted as a refugee under
section 1157 of this title.
INA § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), (B) (Supp. V 1981).
29. "The parole provisions were designed to authorize the Attorney General to act only
in emergent, individual, and isolated situations, such as the case of an alien who requires
immediate medical attention, and not for the immigration of classes or groups outside of the
limit of the law." S. REP. No. 748, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 17, reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 3328, 3335 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 36:865
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into the United States en masse. The Eisenhower administration's
decision to use the parole authority to admit 15,000 Hungarian ref-
ugees following the crisis there in 1956 typified this tendency.30
The almost unlimited political utility of the parole mechanism
became increasingly apparent as new crises arose. Between 1962
and April 1979, over 690,000 Cuban refugees entered the United
States under the Attorney General's parole authority." This figure
does not include over 120,000 Cuban refugees who came from
Mariel between April and September 1980, almost all of whom
were admitted into the United States pursuant to the same parole
authority.2
The Cuban parole program deserves special attention here be-
cause of the large number of refugees involved and the govern-
ment's willingness to relax the admission requirements.sa The Im-
migration and Naturalization Service (INS) allowed the family and
friends of those Cubans desiring to enter the United States to seek
waivers of the nonimmigrant visas normally granted to refugees."
Once paroled into this country, a Cuban alien could achieve per-
30. President Eisenhower announced on December 1, 1956 that 15,000 refugees would
be admitted on a temporary parole basis. Additionally, the government allocated 6,500 im-
migration visas to Hungarian refugees under an accelerated procedure. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS 1956, at 345 (R. Stebbins ed. 1957);
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, THE WHITE HOUSE YEARS-WAGING PEACE: 1956-1961, at 97-98
(1965). During 1956-1957, the Eisenhower administration paroled into the United States
over 31,000 Hungarians. The Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-559, 72 Stat. 419 (repealed
1965), permitted all of the Hungarian parolees to become permanent residents if they satis-
fied the qualitative requirements of the Immigration and Nationality Act. See Immigration:
Hearings on H.R. 7700 Before the Subcomm. No. I on the Judiciary of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 484-86 (1964); see also N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1956, § 1,
at 1, col. 3 (President mobilizes air- and sealift to bring Hungarian parolees to the United
States); N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1956, § 1, at 36, col. 2 (President exceeded numerical restric-
tions of law by giving broad interpretation to emergency provision for admission of
refugees).
31. S. REP. No. 256, supra note 24, at 6, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 141, 146.
32. See, e.g., RESEARCH Div., METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY PLANNING DEP'T, CUBAN AND
HAITIAN REFUGEES (1981); Haitians, Cubans, and the New Refugee Act, 9 IMMIGRATION
NEWSLETTER 8-14 (May-June 1980). Cubans from Mariel started arriving in Key West, Flor-
ida, on April 21, 1980, and by May were coming ashore at a rate in excess of 20,000 a week.
Approximately 90% of the refugees arrived by June 8, 1980. By the end of the year, the
government reported that 124,786 documented Cubans had arrived. RESEARCH DIvISION,
METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY PLANNING DEP'T, CUBAN AND HAITIAN REFUGEES at 1; see also
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1981 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 90.
33. See Woytych, The Cuban Refugee, 16 I. & N. REP. 15 (1967) (relaxing the refugee
admissions process to enable disgruntled Cubans to enter the United States represented but
another political attack launched against the Castro regime following the severance of diplo-
matic relations in 1961).
34. Id. at 16.
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manent resident status after he had lived here for at least two
years.35
The Ford and Carter administrations also used the parole pro-
gram to admit substantial numbers of refugees from the Far East.
Between 1975 and mid-1979, more than 200,000 Indo-Chinese refu-
gees entered the United States under the parole authority."6 Parole
programs also have been established to admit anticommunist Chi-
nese, 7 Soviet Jews,"8 Ugandan Asians, '3 9 and Eastern Europeans."'
In sharp contrast to the preferential treatment accorded
Cubans and other parolees fleeing from communist countries,' the
Justice Department has denied or severely restricted parole admis-
sions when cold war objectives might be thwarted. This generally is
the case when a refugee comes from a noncommunist country
whose government has diplomatic ties with the United States. For
example, following the overthrow of the Allende government, the
Attorney General administered the Chilean parole program very
restrictively, allowing few Chileans to enter this country." Haitians
and El Salvadorans, fleeing regimes supported by the United
States, have been accorded even worse treatment." Rather than
35. Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, § 1, 80 Stat. 1161, 1161, amended by Act of
Oct. 20, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-571, § 8, 90 Stat. 2703, 2706; Act of Mar. 17, 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-212, § 203(i), 94 Stat. 102, 108 (codified as amended at.8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1976 & Supp. V
1981)) (amended to permit residency one year after entry).
36. S. REP. No. 256, supra note 24, at 6, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
Nzws at 146.
37. Id.
38. Id.; DEPARTMENT OP JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, 1973 AN-
NUAL REPORT 5.
39. S. REP. No. 256, supra note 24, at 6, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 146.
40. Id.
41. The Reagan administration has continued the policy of favoring refugees fleeing
communist regimes. For example, Attorney General Smith in his testimony before the Sen-
ate recommended setting a limit of 173,000 refugee admissions in 1982, of which 100,000
would come from Indo-China. Cohodas, Committees Starting Work on Immigration Law
Reform, 39 CONG. Q.W. REP. 2067, 2068 (1981).
43. The government paroled fewer than 2,000 Chileans into the United States between
1975-1977. S. REP. No. 256, supra note 24, at 6, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
Nzws at 146. For an excellent discussion of the Chilean program and the surrounding con-
troversy, see Note, Behind the Paper Curtain: Asylum Policy Versus Asylum Practice, 7
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 107 (1978).
44. The presence and processing of Haitians in Miami, Florida became a problem in
1978. By June of that year, 6,000 to 7,000 Haitians had asylum applications pending with
the INS. After the Service accelerated deportation hearings and the processing of asylum
applications, the Haitians brought an action alleging discrimination and violation of their
due process and equal protection rights. The United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida held that the Haitians' claims were valid and that those Haitians whose
[Vol. 36:865
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establish parole programs for these groups of refugees, the United
States government has incarcerated them and, in most instances,
denied them asylum.45
2. WITHHOLDING OF DEPORTATION
The broad criteria used by government to admit refugees
through parole programs differ radically from the strict and narrow
requirements established by the INS to withhold deportation due
to fear of persecution. Originally, section 23 of the Internal Secur-
ity Act of 195046 empowered the Attorney General to withhold the
deportation of any alien whose return to his homeland would sub-
ject him to "physical persecution." Congress eventually codified
this criterion in section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952.47 Although slightly modified by the courts,48 section
applications for asylum had been rejected could not be deported until they were given a fair
opportunity to present their claims for asylum. Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F.
Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980), modified sub nom. Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d
1023 (5th Cir. 1982) (INS violated due process rights of Haitians to seek asylum in the
United States).
During 1981 the influx of Haitians accelerated. Beginning in July, arriving Haitians
were sent to detention centers to await possible deportation. In September the flow of Hai-
tians abated as President Reagan gave United States Navy vessels the authority to interdict
ships carrying undocumented aliens into the United States. See Cohodas, supra note 41, at
2069. The detained Haitians were released in mid-1982 after the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida held that the government's detention program
did not comply with the Administrative Procedure Act. Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 1004
(S.D. Fla. 1982).
Refugees from El Salvador have faced similar treatment by the INS. In Nunez v.
Boldin, 537 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Tex. 1982), the INS held El Salvadorans in a detention
center and restricted their access to legal assistance. Further, the government screened the
correspondence of the detainees. The district court held that the government activity consti-
tuted a violation of the refugees' fundamental rights, and enjoined the INS from engaging in
these restrictive practices. Additionally, the court established the right of the detainees to
know that they were entitled to apply for political asylum in the United States. See also
Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
45. In 1982 INS granted asylum to 7 Haitians; denied asylum to 112 Haitians; and had
6,035 Haitian applications for asylum pending at the end of the year. In the same year, INS
granted asylum to 69 El Salvadorans; denied asylum to 1,178 El Salvadorans; and had
22,314 El Salvadoran applications for asylum pending at the end of the year. IMMIGRATION
AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE REPORT: ASYLUM APPLICATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1982.
46. Ch. 1024, § 23, 64 Stat. 987, 1010 (1950) (amending Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29,
§ 20, 39 Stat. 874, 890) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (Supp. V 1981)).
47. INA § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253 (1976 & Supp V 1981).
48. For example, in Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958), the Court held that §
243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act applies only to aliens already in the United
States, and that this category does not include aliens who have been released on parole
pending a determination of the alien's admissibility. If the government finds that the alien
is ineligible for entry and orders him excluded, then the provisions of § 243(h) are not appli-
1982]
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243(h) remained the controlling test for withholding deportation
for thirteen years.
In 1965, after four administrations had expressed concern that
the "physical persecution" standard was unduly restrictive,4 Con-
gress amended section 243(h) to permit the Attorney General to
withhold deportation if he believed that the alien in question
"would be subject to persecution on account of race, religion, or
political opinion" upon return to his native country.50 Only if the
particular alien faced a "clear probability" of persecution could
this discretion be favorably exercised." Although the law no longer
limited persecution to physical forms, it did grant the Attorney
General broad discretion to withhold deportation" and imposed a
rigorous burden of proof on an alien seeking to obtain asylum."
The United States adoption in 1968 of the United Nations
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 54 did not lower the
standard of proof necessary to establish persecution and, therefore,
did not make it easier for an alien to seek political asylum to avoid
deportation.55 Thus, aliens from noncommunist countries had to
satisfy a rigorous burden and standard of proof to successfully pe-
tition the government to withhold their deportation. 5"
Although the Refugee Act of 198057 sought to apply the U.N.
Protocol, it is questionable whether the Act has changed the stan-
dard of proof required for the grant of relief under section
243(h).58 Section 201(a)(42)59 adopted the definition of "refugee"
cable to the case. Id. at 187-89.
49. Evans, The Political Refugee in United States Immigration Law and Practice, 3
INT'L LAw 204, 220 (1969); see also 111 CONG. REc. H21,803-04 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1965)
(remarks of Congressman Poff, sponsor of amendment to section 243(h)).
50. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 11(f), 79 Stat. 911, 918 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)); see supra note 47; see generally
Evans, supra note 49, at 225-48.
51. See, e.g., Cheng Kai Fu v. INS, 386 F.2d 750, 753 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 1003 (1968); Lena v. INS, 379 F.2d 536, 538 (7th Cir. 1967).
52. See Kasrari v. INS, 400 F.2d 675, 677-78 (9th Cir. 1968).
53. See infra note 67.
54. See U.N. Protocol, supra note 4.
55. See, e.g., Pierre v. United States, 547 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir.), vacated and remanded
to consider mootness, 434 U.S. 962 (1977); In re Dunar, 14 I. & N. DEC. 310 (Apr. 17, 1973).
56. Cisternas-Estay v. INS, 531 F.2d 155 (1976); Gena v. INS, 424 F.2d 227 (1970).
57. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (1976 &
Supp. V 1981)).
58. Rejaie v. INS, 691 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1982). But see Stevic v. Sava, 678 F.2d 401, 406
(2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted sub nom. Stevic v. INS, 51 U.S.L.W. 3627 (U.S. Mar. 1, 1983)
(No. 82-973).
59. Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201(a)(42), 94 Stat. 102, 102, 8 U.S.C. § 101(a)(42) (Supp. V
1981); see supra note 4.
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contained in the U.N. Protocol, and section 243(h) underwent
modification to conform to article 33 of the U.N. Convention." Un-
fortunately, the narrowly drawn strict legal barriers to admission
remain.
3. POLITICAL ASYLUM
The inquiry in withholding of deportation and asylum cases is
often similar. As in withholding cases, the decision whether to
grant political asylum used to lie within the Attorney General's
discretion.
Prior to the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980, asylum ex-
isted only by virtue of INS regulations, which provided that asy-
lum could be requested before the District Director of INS."
The Refugee Act of 1980 substantively changed the procedures
used by aliens to obtain political asylum. The broad authority of
the President under section 207(b) e2 to grant refugee status re-
60. Section 243(h) now reads:
(1) The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien ... to a
country if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom
would be threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any alien if the Attorney General deter-
mines that-
(A) the alien ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated
in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nation-
ality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion;
(B) the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of
the United States;
(C) there are serious reasons for considering that the alien has
committed a serious non-political crime outside the United States
prior to the arrival of the alien in the United States; or
(D) there are reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a
danger to the security of the United States.
INA § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
61. 8 C.F.R. § 108 (1972). See also Sannon v. United States, 427 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D.
Fla. 1977), vacated, 566 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1978) (INS procedures were informal and often
haphazard).
62. Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 207(b), 94 Stat. 102, 103 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1157(b)
(Supp. V 1981)). Section 207(b) provides:
If the President determines, after appropriate consultation, that (1) an un-
foreseen emergency refugee situation exists, (2) the admission of certain refugees
in~response to the emergency refugee situation is justified by grave humanitarian
concerns or is otherwise in the national interest, and (3) the admission to the
United States of these refugees cannot be accomplished under subsection (a) of
this section, the President may fix a number of refugees to be admitted to the
United States during the succeeding period (not to exceed twelve months) in
response to the emergency refugee situation and such admissions shall be allo-
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placed the Attorney General's authority to order conditional entry
under section 203(a)(7). Moreover, section 208(a)63 of the new Act
authorized the creation of a uniform procedure to govern asylum
applications. This procedure appears in regulations recently
promulgated by the INS.
6
4
Under the INS's procedures, an alien can apply for asylum
with the district director who has jurisdiction over the particular
port or region. 65 Once an alien files an application, the district di-
rector must request an advisory opinion on the application from
the State Department's Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitar-
ian Affairs." Additionally, the INS representative must provide
the alien applicant an opportunity to establish that he cannot re-
turn to his homeland or place of habitual residence because of a
"well-founded fear of persecution. 6 7 The decision whether to ap-
prove or deny the asylum application lies in the discretion of the
district director and is subject to agency and judicial review.68
III. REFLECTIONS ON THE POLICY UNDERLYING REFUGEE
ADMISSIONS
A. A Realistic Appraisal of the Refugee Admissions Process
A comparison of the admissions process for persons seeking
political asylum or the withholding of deportation with the admis-
sions process for those obtaining entry through parole or particu-
larlized federal legislation dramatically demonstrates the
cated among refugees of special humanitarian concern to the United States in
accordance with a determination made by the President after the appropriate
consultation provided under this subsection.
Id. The Refugee Act also prohibits the Attorney General from paroling aliens who are refu-
gees "unless [he] determines that compelling reasons in the public interest with respect to
that particular alien require [parole] ..... " Id. § 212(d)(5)(B) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1182(d)(5)(B) (Supp. V 1981)).
63. Id. § 208(a) (codified at 8 U.S.C. 1158(a) (Supp. V 1981)).
64. Aliens and Nationality, 8 C.F.R. § 208 (1983).
65. Id. §§ 208.1-.3.
66. Id. § 208.7.
67. Id. § 208.5. The burden is on the alien to prove probable persecution upon his or
her return. Id. § 208.5. In practice, aliens have had great difficulty in meeting this standard
of proof. The INS has a legal duty to inform an alien that he has the right to apply for
asylum. See, e.g., Nunez v. Boldin, 537 F. Supp. 578, 584 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Louis v. Meiss-
ner, 530 F. Supp. 924, 927 (S.D. Fla. 1981). For a thorough discussion of this standard and
the near impossible obstacle it puts in the path of the would-be "refugee," see Note, The
Right of Asylum Under United States Immigration Law, 33 U. FLA. L. REy. 539, 555-58
(1981). This article also discusses the likely effect that the definition of "persecution" con-
tained in the Refugee Act of 1980 will have on the alien's burden of proof. Id. at 559-61.
68. Aliens and Nationality, 8 C.F.R. § 208.8-.10.
[Vol. 36:865
ANALYSIS OF REFUGEE LAW
politicization of the immigration process. Since the end of World
War II, a dual process for admitting persons seeking freedom from
political or religious persecution has developed. On the one hand,
there is the parole process" or the broad statutory admission pow-
ers, 0 which is entirely discretionary.1 On the other hand, there
exists a highly technical body of law with an extraordinarily high
standard of proof7 reserved for those seeking political asylum73 or
the withholding of their deportation.74 The latter processes princi-
pally exclude refugees seeking shelter from noncommunist coun-
tries whose immigration to the United States would not promote
cold war objectives."5 Very few persons have ever successfully chal-
lenged the INS's denial of political asylum or withholding of de-
portation because legal standards and not political criteria guide
these decisions.
In stark contrast to the legal guidelines governing asylum and
deportation decisions, the establishment of a parole program for a
particular nationality is not susceptible to judicial review. Parole
programs are administered by and subject to executive authority,
and the decision to establish a parole program for Cubans instead
of, for example, El Salvadorans, is a political decision left to the
executive branch and can neither be challenged nor reviewed. In
fact, these programs simply do not contain the elements that we
69. See supra notes 28-45 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 9-27 and accompanying text.
71. The Chilean experience is a case in point. Many Chileans sought asylum in the
United States after a military coup ousted the Allende government. The Chileans' efforts
were largely futile due to our nation's concern with the evacuation of thousands of Indo-
Chinese, whose requests for parole came during consideration of the Chileans' plight. In
short, the neutrality of the American government's asylum policy was put to the test and it
failed. See Note, aupra note 43, at 109-17.
72. See supra notes 56, 58 & 67 and accompanying text.
73. See aupra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 46-60 and accompanying text.
75. The government has used the asylum and withholding of deportation processes as
legal hurdles to impede the entry of thousands of refugees fleeing noncommunist repressive
countries such as Haiti and El Salvador. See, e.g., Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973 (S.D.
Fla.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, No. 82-5772 (11th Cir. Apr. 12, 1983); Orantes-Hernandez
v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F.
Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980), modified sub nom. Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d
1023 (5th Cir. 1982).
76. An alien does not legally enter the United States until the government has granted
his parole request. See Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 189 (1958). If denied parole,
the alien is categorized as "excluded" and may not be accorded the same rights as citizens,
residents, or deportable aliens. But see Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382
(10th Cir. 1981); Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973 (1982). The Supreme Court of the
United States has recognized the constitutionality of procedures governing excludable
aliens. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).
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generally consider necessary to a "legal system."77
The lack of legal standards to evaluate parole programs leaves
them susceptible to inconsistent and politically partial manage-
ment. For example, in determining parole or asylum for Haitian or
El Salvadoran refugees, the government has not applied the same
criteria it used to decide the fate of Cubans or Indo-Chinese who
previously sought parole.78 That these comparisons are not made
by the government is not surprising. The parole process purposely
diverts certain refugees, most notably those from communist coun-
tries, from the legal system, thereby ensuring that they will be ad-
mitted irrespective of the validity of their individual claims. The
effective intent of this purposeful exclusion is to select and favor
particular groups of refugees. Thus, while the United States has
admitted hundreds of thousands of refugees from Asia and Eastern
Europe before 1980' it has admitted less than 10,000 refugees
from Africa,80 probably the most refugee-ridden continent in the
world.8"
B. The Refugee Act of 1980: Part of the Solution or Part of
the Problem?
An end to the use of refugee admissions for political purposes
appeared to be in sight when Congress enacted the Refugee Act of
1980.82 Congress passed the Act with the intent of eliminating the
traditional biases in refugee programs8" by adopting the facially
neutral standard of the United Nations Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees.8 4 The Act eliminated the broad parole author-
ity traditionally exercised by the Attorney General 8 and ostensibly
limited the use of parole under section 212(d)(5) to a case-by-case
77. See, e.g., H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF THE LAW (1961).
78. See generally Haitians, Cubans, and the New Refugee Act, 9 IMMIGRATION NEWS-
LETTER 1 (May-June 1980). For a discussion of various INS memos reflecting prejudgment of
the Haitians' asylum claims, see Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442, 513-
16 (S.D. Fla. 1980), modified sub nom. Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th
Cir. 1982).
79. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
80. S. REP. No. 256, supra note 24, at 6, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 146.
81. See Szulc, The Refugee Explosion, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1980, § 6 (Magazine), at
136.
82. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102.
83. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 4; supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
85. Pub. L. No. 96-212, §§ 207(b), 212(d)(5)(B), 94 Stat. 102, 103, 108; see supra note
62 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 36:865
ANALYSIS OF REFUGEE LAW
basis."6
Contrary to the expectations of its sponsors,87 however, the
Refugee Act of 1980 has institutionalized rather than eliminated
political choice. Although the structure of the Act restricts parole
under 212(d)(5), it now permits the executive branch to establish
annual parole programs. The President has the authority to desig-
nate, each year, the geographic locations and number of refugees or
persons of special humanitarian concern who may enter the United
States. 8 The number of refugees admitted annually has varied
since passage of the Act, but generally less than five percent of the
admissions have come from noncommunist areas.89 In November
1981, the President announced that 140,000 refugees would be ad-
mitted in fiscal year 1982: 100,000 persons from Asia, 20,000 from
the Soviet Union, 9,000 from Eastern Europe, 5,000 from the Near
East, 3,000 from Latin America and the Caribbean, and 3,000 from
Africa.90 This distribution mirrors the pattern of allocations for the
admission of refugees established before passage of the Refugee
Act of 1980.91
The statistics on refugee admissions for the last two years
prove that a neutral selection process is not at work. The fact that
the United States admits proportionately few refugees from the
countries with the largest refugee populations proves that point.
86. Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 212(d)(5)(B), 94 Stat. 102, 108 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1182(d)(5)(B) (Supp. V 1981)).
87. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
88. Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 207(a), 94 Stat. 102, 103 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a) (Supp.
V 1981)). Section 207(a) provides:
(1) [Tihe number of refugees who may be admitted under this section in
fiscal year 1980, 1981, or 1982, may not exceed fifty thousand unless the Presi-
dent determines, before the beginning of the fiscal year and after appropriate
consultation . . . that admission of a specific number of refugees in excess of
such number is justified by humanitarian concerns or is otherwise in the na-
tional interest.
(2) [T]he number of refugees who may be admitted under this section in
any fiscal year after fiscal year 1982 shall be such number as the President deter-
mines, before the beginning of the fiscal year and after appropriate consultation,
is justified by humanitarian concerns or is otherwise in the national interest.
(3) Admissions under this subsection shall be allocated among refugees of
special humanitarian concern to the United States in accordance with a determi-
nation made by the President after appropriate consultation.
Id. For an excellent and thorough discussion of the provision's legislative development, see
Anker & Posner, supra note 14, at 43-51. Translated into practical terms, the Refugee Act
of 1980 gives the President virtually absolute discretion over refugee admissions.
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For example, the largest concentration of refugees in the world is
in Africa, 92 and substantial numbers of refugees presently seeking
asylum are from the Caribbean and Latin America-particularly
El Salvador and Haiti. Yet the 1982 State Department reports ac-
companying the refugee admissions allocations fail to mention Hai-
tians and Central Americans and limit African admission to but a
few thousand."8
The Refugee Act of 1980 not only institutionalizes political
choice as the primary criterion for allocating refugee admissions,
but it also fails to curb the extensive use of the parole power.
Politics and parole apparently are complementary concepts, as
demonstrated by the results of the massive Cuban exodus in
1980.' Less than a month after passage of the Act, over 120,000
Cuban refugees began to enter the United States as parolees."5 Al-
though section 212(d)(5) mandated that the government review
each parole application individually," the Carter administration
simply circumvented this requirement by designating the Mariel
Cubans as entrants rather than refugees.' 7
In summary, the substance of the Refugee Act of 1980 contin-
ues to permit refugee admissions to serve political objectives."
Moreover, continued reliance on sections 243(h) and 208 of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act to determine the fate of a relatively
small number of persons seeking admission provides the dual func-
tion of creating the appearance of formal legal standards in the
refugee admissions process, while diverting attention from the vast
numbers of refugees who are admitted on a nonformal and nonle-
gal basis. The withholding and asylum processes serve as a conven-
ient method for determining the claims of refugee groups whose
admission does not serve political objectives." The standard and
burden of proof in these cases is weighted so heavily against the
applicants-given their usual backgrounds and legal re-
sources-that the rejection of their claims is almost always
92. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
93. IMMIGRATION J. 20 (Mar.-Apr. 1982).
94. See supra notes 1-4 & 32 and accompanying text.
95. Id.; N.Y. Times, May 21, 1980, at 24, col. 1.
96. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
97. N.Y. Times, May 21, 1980, at 24, col. 1 (remarks of Jack R. Watson, Jr., Special
Assistant to the President for Intergovernmental Affairs).
98. See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
99. The INS routinely makes its decisions on the basis of political considerations, espe-
cially foreign policy. See Note, supra note 67, at 561 n.174.
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assured.100
The Refugee Act, however, does perform a significant ideologi-
cal function. By adopting the United Nations Protocol standard0 1
for refugees, the Act satisfies the demand of our legal system for a
facially neutral criterion for admission. Gone is the prior distinc-
tion between the standard for determining eligibility for a discre-
tionary grant of asylum 10 2 and the standard for determining eligi-
bility for conditional entrants under 203(a)(7). A uniform
definition of "refugee" replaces these disparate standards. In doing
so, this purportedly impartial criterion reinforces the traditional
ideological belief1 0 3 that the United States can and should be a ha-
ven for refugees from all parts of the world, regardless of their po-
litical origins; in practice, however, it does nothing to eliminate the
traditional use of refugees for cold war purposes.
IV. CONCLUSION
For years, the refugee admissions process has been used to fur-
ther political objectives rather than to assist those aliens most in
need of help. Admissions decisions reflected a cold war mentality
that effectively transformed immigration policy into mere propa-
ganda. That the process was susceptible to this manipulation was
due to the lack of objective legal standards to govern admissions
decisions; consequently, the government had unbridled discretion
to shape refugee policy. With the enactment of the Refugee Act of
1980, many hoped that refugee admissions would finally become an
apolitical tool capable of alleviating the suffering of thousands of
persecuted people abroad. Although the Act valiantly attempts to
achieve this objective-section 212(d)(5) is a case in point-it still
falls short of its appointed task because its provisions are easily
circumvented and the executive branch has too much discretionary
authority.
One method for revising the current refugee admissions pro-
cess would be to end the duality between the formal United Na-
tions definition for the admission of refugees and the substantive
selection, along ideological lines, of the actual refugees admitted.
To accomplish this goal, the government must assess the total ref-
100. Id. at 555-60; supra notes 56, 58 & 67 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 4, 54-60 and accompanying text.
102. The discretionary power was previously authorized by section 203(a)(7) and is now
currently authorized by section 207 of the INA.
103. This traditional belief is emblazoned on the Statue of Liberty: "Give me your
tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free .... "
1982]
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ugee populations from each continent and then devise a propor-
tionate share system of visa allocations relating to the number of
refugees from that continent. In this way, Africa and Latin
America, both of which have been traditionally and recently disfa-
vored, would receive a substantially greater and fairer allotment of
visa allocations. A system devised along these lines would enhance
the integrity of the refugee process by minimizing its traditional
use as a political fulcrum.
